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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Scott Alan Moore appeals from the district court's order denying his 
motion to amend the judgment of conviction entered upon his guilty plea to aiding 
and abetting a robbery. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In June 2003, Moore pied guilty to aiding and abetting a robbery. (R., 
pp.54-57.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of five years with two 
years fixed, and retained jurisdiction for 180 days. (Id.) Following the period of 
retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended Moore's sentence and placed 
him on probation for five years. (R., pp.65-70.) 
In May 2014, Moore moved the district court to amend his judgment of 
conviction pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604.1 (R., pp.77-79.) The state prosecutor 
objected to the motion. (See R., p.81.) The district court denied the motion, 
concluding that I.C. § 19-2604(3) prevented it from amending Moore's judgment 
of conviction without the consent of the prosecutor. (R., pp.81-82.) Moore timely 
appealed. (R., pp.83-86.) 
1 Neither Moore's affidavit in support of his motion (which Moore referred to in his 
motion), nor the prosecutor's objection to it (which the district court referred to in 
its denial order), appear to be included in the appellate record. (See R., pp.77-
89; 81-82.) 
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ISSUES 
Moore states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Does the Jurisdictional Requirement That Prosecutor 
Stipulate to Relief Sought Under Idaho Code § 19-2604 
Violate Separation of Powers? 
2. Does Idaho Code § 19-2604 Violate the Appellant's Equal 
Protection Rights Under the 14th Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article I Section 2 of the Idaho 
Constitution? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Moore failed to show that I.C. § 19-2604(3) violates the separation of 
powers provision of the Idaho Constitution? 
2. Has Moore failed to show that I.C. § 19-2604(3) violates the equal 
protection clause of the United States or Idaho constitutions? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Moore has Failed To Show That I.C. § 19-2604(3) Violates The Separation Of 
Powers Provision Of The Idaho Constitution 
A. Introduction 
For the first time on appeal, Moore contends that I.C. § 19-2604(3) 
violates the separation of powers provisions of the Idaho Constitution. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.4-6.) Moore's argument fails because I.C. § 19-2604(3) 
does not deprive either the legislative or judicial branches of any inherent or 
constitutional power that rightly pertains to those branches. Moore has therefore 
failed to demonstrate fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, the appellate court 
reviews it de nova. State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 
(2003). The party challenging the constitutionality of the statute must overcome 
a strong presumption of constitutionality and clearly show the invalidity of the 
statute. kl The appellate court is obligated to seek a construction of a statute 
that upholds its constitutionality. kl Additionally, "[i]t is a fundamental tenet of 
appellate law that a proper and timely objection must be made in the trial court 
before an issue is preserved for appeal." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 
P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). The appellate courts of this state will only review 
unpreserved assertions of error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. 
Perry, 150 Idaho 209,226,245 P.3d 961,978 (2010). 
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C. Idaho Code § 19-2604(3) Does Not Deprive The Judiciary Of Any Of Its 
Inherent Or Constitutional Powers 
Idaho Code § 19-2604(1) permits individuals who are on criminal 
probation to petition the district court, in certain prescribed circumstances, to set 
aside their conviction and dismiss the case, or to commute their sentence and 
amend a felony judgment of conviction to a misdemeanor. Idaho Code § 19-
2604(2) permits individuals whose felony sentences had been suspended to the 
custody of the state board of correction during the first 365 days of the sentence 
to petition the district court, in certain prescribed circumstances, to commute their 
sentence and amend their judgment of conviction to a misdemeanor. In 2013, 
the legislature amended I.C. § 19-2604(3) and expanded the applicability of 
available relief as follows: 
(3) (a) In addition to the circumstances in which relief from a felony 
conviction may be granted under subsections (1) and (2) of this 
section, a defendant who has been convicted of a felony and who 
has been discharged from probation may apply to the sentencing 
court for a reduction of the conviction from a felony to a 
misdemeanor as provided in this subsection. 
(b) If less than five (5) years have elapsed since the defendant's 
discharge from probation, the application may be granted only if the 
prosecuting attorney stipulates to the reduction. 
(c) If at least five (5) years have elapsed since the defendant's 
discharge from probation, and if the defendant was convicted of 
any of the following offenses, the application may be granted only if 
the prosecuting attorney stipulates to the reduction: [List of 
applicable offenses, including robbery, I.C. § 18-6501]. 
(d) The decision as to whether to grant such an application shall be 
in the discretion of the district court, provided that the application 
may be granted only if the court finds that: 
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(i) The defendant has not been convicted of any 
felony committed after the conviction from which relief 
is sought; 
(ii) The defendant is not currently charged with any 
crime; 
(iii) There is good cause for granting the reduction in 
sentence; and 
(iv) In those cases where the stipulation of the 
prosecuting attorney is required under paragraph (b) or 
(c) of this subsection, the prosecuting attorney has so 
stipulated. 
(e) If the court grants the application, the court shall reduce the 
felony conviction to a misdemeanor and amend the judgment of 
conviction for a term in the custody of the state board of correction 
to "confinement in a penal facility" for the number of days served 
prior to the judgment of conviction. 
S.L. 2013, ch. 256, § 1, eff. July 1, 2013. 
Therefore, following the effective date of this amendment to the statute, 
individuals convicted of robbery may, upon their discharge from probation, 
petition the district court to amend their conviction to a misdemeanor. I.C. § 19-
2604(3). However, the district court may exercise its discretion and consider 
such a request only if the prosecutor stipulates to the reduction. Isl 
Article II, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution distributes power to the three 
distinct departments of government, and provides that "no person or collection of 
persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these 
departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, 
except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted." Article V, § 13 of 
the Idaho Constitution specifically prohibits the legislature from "depriv[ing] the 
judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it." 
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Further, while the Idaho Constitution does not expressly prohibit the delegation of 
legislative power, it has been interpreted to prevent it. See Board of County 
Com'rs of Twin Falls County v. Idaho Health Facilities Authority, 96 Idaho 498, 
508, 531 P.2d 588, 598 (1974) (citing State v. Purcell, 39 Idaho 642, 649, 228 
P.796, 797 (1924) (" ... except as authorized by the organic law, the legislative 
department cannot delegate any of its powers to make laws to any other body or 
authority")) (emphasis added). 
For the first time on appeal, Moore contends that l.C. § 19-2604(3) 
violates the separation of powers provisions of the Idaho Constitution because it 
"unconstitutionally delegates lawmaking and/or judicial authority to the prosecutor 
by limiting relief to those defendants with whom the prosecuting attorney 
stipulates to relief." (Appellant's brief, p.5.) Because Moore failed to challenge 
the constitutionality of l.C. § 19-2604 below, he must demonstrate fundamental 
error. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. To do so, he must demonstrate: 
(1) a constitutional violation; (2) that the violation is clear and obvious without the 
need for additional information not contained in the appellate record; (3) and that 
prejudice resulted. kl Moore has failed to make such a showing. 
Idaho Code § 19-2604(3) does not deprive the judicial department of any 
inherent or constitutional power. The judicial department does not have the 
inherent or constitutional power to reduce felony convictions years after a 
defendant is discharged from probation. Indeed, to the contrary, it is well-settled 
in Idaho that a district court has no jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment 
once the judgment becomes final, either by expiration of the time for appeal or 
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affirmance of the judgment on appeal, unless a statute or rule extends its 
jurisdiction. State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 354, 79 P.2d 711, 713 (2003). 
Idaho Code § 19-2604(3) is such a statute that grants a district court the 
jurisdiction to amend an otherwise final judgment. The district court would not 
have this power absent this statute. Therefore, I.C. § 19-2604(3) does not 
"deprive" the district court of any power that "rightly pertains" to the judiciary, and 
instead merely attaches conditions precedent, including the stipulation of the 
prosecutor, to the grant of the power. 
Likewise, Moore has failed to demonstrate that I.C. § 19-2604(3) 
improperly divests the legislature of any of its own inherent or constitutional 
powers. The power granted to the prosecutor by I.C. § 19-2604(3) is not a power 
to define an offense, or to make laws, or to perform any other inherently 
legislative function. Instead, I.C. § 19-2604(3) simply grants the prosecutor the 
limited power to stipulate to, or to veto, an individual's attempt to obtain a 
reduction of his felony sentence, where the individual is otherwise eligible to 
petition for such relief under the criteria set forth in that statute. This does not 
amount to an unconstitutional delegation of exclusively legislative power. 
Idaho Code § 19-2604(3) does not unconstitutionally divest power of 
either the judiciary or legislative branches. Moore has therefore failed to meet 
his burden to demonstrate clear and obvious constitutional error. This Court 
should therefore affirm the district court's order denying his motion to amend his 
judgment. 
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11. 
Moore Has Failed To Show That I.C. § 19-2604(3) Violates The Equal Protection 
Clause Of The United States Or Idaho Constitutions 
A Introduction 
For the first time on appeal, Moore contends that I.C. § 19-2604(3) 
violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and Idaho 
constitutions. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-11.) Moore's claim fails because he has 
failed to identify any unconstitutionally discriminatory classification in the 
language of I.C. § 19-2604(3), and because he has failed to allege or 
demonstrate that the prosecutor's decision not to stipulate to his petition for relief 
was motivated by some improper purpose. Moore has therefore failed to 
demonstrate fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, the appellate court 
reviews it de nova. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 711, 69 P.3d at 131. The party 
challenging the constitutionality of the statute must overcome a strong 
presumption of constitutionality and clearly show the invalidity of the statute. kl 
The appellate court is obligated to seek a construction of a statute that upholds 
its constitutionality. kl Additionally, "[i]t is a fundamental tenet of appellate law 
that a proper and timely objection must be made in the trial court before an issue 
is preserved for appeal." Carlson, 134 Idaho at 398, 3 P.3d at 76. The appellate 
courts of this state will only review unpreserved assertions of error under the 
fundamental error doctrine. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. 
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C. Idaho Code § 19-2604(3) Does Not Violate The Equal Protection Clause 
Of Either The United States Or Idaho Constitutions 
The Supreme Court of the United States "has long held that a 
classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceedings along suspect 
lines ... cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational 
relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate 
governmental purpose." Armour v. City of Indianapolis, Ind.,_ U.S._, 132 
S.Ct. 2073, 2079-2080 (2012) (internal quotes and citations omitted, ellipse 
original). Thus, the "first step in an equal protection analysis is to identify the 
classification at issue." Bagley v. Thomason, 155 Idaho 193, 198, 307 P.3d 
1219, 1224 (2013) (internal quotes and citations omitted). Where a party 
claiming an equal protection violation has failed to identify a classification, the 
Court will not review that claim because "this Court does not consider issues not 
supported by argument or authority." kl (internal quotes and citations omitted). 
The exercise of prosecutorial discretion is subject to constitutional 
constraints under the Equal Protection Clause: "the decision to prosecute may 
not be 'deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, 
or other arbitrary classification."' Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 
(1985) (citations omitted). This standard requires that an accused "show both 
that the [alleged selective] enforcement [decision] had a discriminatory effect and 
that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose." lit See Snowden v. Hughes, 
321 U.S. 1, 8 (1974) (to prevail on equal protection claim that facially neutral 
statute is being applied unequally, "intentional or purposeful discrimination" must 
be shown). In the absence of evidence the prosecutor deliberately chose to 
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exercise its discretion in a certain manner because of the individual's religion or 
some other improper factor, the prosecutor's "conscious exercise of some 
selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation." Oyler 
v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962); see also United States v. Batchelder, 442 
U.S. 114 (1979). Courts have applied these and related principles to both a 
prosecutor's inherent charging discretion, and more limited discretion granted it 
by state statutes through the legislature. See ~ Manduley v. Superior Court, 
27 Cal.4th 537, 567-573 (Cal. 2002); State v. Lindsey, 554 N.W.2d 215, 222-224 
(Wis. App. 1996); Davis v. Municipal Court, 757 P.2d 11, 25-26 (Cal. 1988); State 
v. Hartsook, 21 N.E.3d 617, 628-631 (Ohio App. 2014). 
In this case, for the first time on appeal, Moore asserts that I.C. § 19-
2604(3) violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and Idaho 
constitutions by treating individuals with whom the prosecutor has stipulated for 
relief differently from those whom the prosecutor has declined to enter a 
stipulation with. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-11.) Again, because Moore failed to 
challenge the constitutionality of l.C. § 19-2604 in the district court, he must 
demonstrate fundamental error. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. To 
do so, he must demonstrate: (1) a constitutional violation; (2) that the violation is 
clear and obvious without the need for additional information not contained in the 
appellate record; (3) and that prejudice resulted. kL. Moore cannot make such a 
showing. 
While Moore frames his equal protection challenge as one to l.C. § 19-
2604(3), he does not appear to take issue with any of the classifications made by 
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the language of the statute itself - such as the specific crime an individual was 
convicted of, or the number of years that have passed since the individual has 
been discharged from probation. (See Appellant's brief, pp.6-11.) Instead, 
Moore's challenge centers around the statutory requirement that prosecutors 
stipulate to any LC. § 19-2604(3) request for relief before a district court may 
consider it. (See id.) This is not a requirement or "classification" subject to a 
statutory equal protection analysis because it is not a classification created by 
the statute. Indeed, all individuals who meet the criteria enumerated in I.C. § 19-
2604(3) are equally subject to the prosecutor's discretion whether to stipulate to 
their request to amend their felony judgment of conviction. Any unequal 
treatment of such individuals is based not upon the statutory language of I.C. § 
19-2604(3), but from the decisions of individual prosecutors. See Manduley, 27 
Cal.4th at 567-573 (holding that state statute's grant of prosecutorial discretion to 
file charges against some minors but not others did not violate equal protection 
clause where all charged minors were equally subject to such discretion); 
Beanblossom v. State, 637 N.E.2d 1345, 1346-1349 (Ind. App. 1994) (holding 
that state statute requiring trial court to obtain prosecutor's approval before 
modifying convicted defendant's sentence did not violate equal protection 
principles where appellant argued statute divided individuals into two classes -
those with whom the prosecutor stipulated to relief, and those with whom the 
prosecutor did not). Because Moore has failed to identify a classification actually 
created by the language of the statute, he cannot show error, let alone clear and 
obvious constitutional error as required by the fundamental error doctrine. 
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To the extent this Court construes Moore's argument as instead attacking 
the prosecutor's action in declining to stipulate to the amending of his judgment 
of conviction in this case, he has still failed to demonstrate an equal protection 
violation. Moore has not attempted to show that he was singled out based upon 
some improper criteria. Instead, he appears to assert that the mere possibility of 
disperate treatment created by I.C. § 19-2604(3) offends the equal protection 
clause. However, Moore has failed to cite any authority standing for the 
proposition that a statute's mere grant of discretionary prosecutorial power 
constitutes a de facto equal protection violation. Therefore, Moore has failed to 
demonstrate an equal protection violation, let alone a clear and obvious one, as 
required by Perry. 
Idaho Code § 19-2604(3) does not violate the equal protection clauses of 
the United States or Idaho constitutions.2 Moore has therefore failed to meet his 
burden to demonstrate clear and obvious constitutional error. This Court should 
therefore affirm the district court's order denying his motion to amend his 
judgment. 
2 Moore asserts that equal protection challenges made under the Idaho 
Constitution differ from those made under the United States Constitution in only 
one respect relevant to his challenge - that under the Idaho Constitution, a court 
applies a "means-based scrutiny" "where the discriminatory character of a 
challenged statutory classification is apparent on its face and where there is also 
a patent indication of a lack of relationship between the classification and the 
declared purpose of the statute." (Appellant's brief, pp.7-8 (citing State v. 
Mowrey, 134 Idaho 751, 755, 9 P.3d 1217, 1221 (2000) (other citations omitted)). 
The state asserts that the Idaho Constitution equal protection clause's "means-
based scrutiny" is not applicable to this case because Moore has failed to 
challenge any discriminatory statutory classification made by the actual language 
of I.C § 19-2604(3), let alone one that is "apparent on its face." 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order denying Moore's motion to amend the judgment of conviction entered upon 
his guilty plea to aiding and abetting a robbery. 
DATED this 26th day of January 2015 
MARK V\toLSON ~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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